Minor improvement
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@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ The multi-user security of EdDSA was briefly analyzed in a paper by Bernstein af
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In 2016, Kiltz et. al. provided a tight bound on the multi-user security of Schorr signatures without the need for key-prefixing \cite{C:KilMasPan16}. The tightness was a result of the random self-reducibility property of the underlying canonical identification scheme. Again, this property cannot be achieved by the EdDSA due to the clamping introduced by the key generation algorithm.
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Instead, a different approach must be taken to abtain a tight security proof of the EdDSA signature scheme. Similar to a paper by Fuchsbauer et. al., the algebraic group model is used to directly prove the security of the EdDSA signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption \cite{EC:FucPloSeu20}.
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Instead, a different approach must be taken to abtain a tight security proof of the EdDSA signature scheme. Similar to a paper by Fuchsbauer et. al. \cite{EC:FucPloSeu20}, the algebraic group model is used to directly prove the security of the EdDSA signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption in the single-user setting and the one-more discrete logarithm assumption in the multi-user setting.
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