From f06df944382aa8170fccde5dedbc9aa90e633b5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Kaiser Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 19:06:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Minor improvement --- thesis/sections/related_work.tex | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/thesis/sections/related_work.tex b/thesis/sections/related_work.tex index a155656..dde370c 100644 --- a/thesis/sections/related_work.tex +++ b/thesis/sections/related_work.tex @@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ The multi-user security of EdDSA was briefly analyzed in a paper by Bernstein af In 2016, Kiltz et. al. provided a tight bound on the multi-user security of Schorr signatures without the need for key-prefixing \cite{C:KilMasPan16}. The tightness was a result of the random self-reducibility property of the underlying canonical identification scheme. Again, this property cannot be achieved by the EdDSA due to the clamping introduced by the key generation algorithm. -Instead, a different approach must be taken to abtain a tight security proof of the EdDSA signature scheme. Similar to a paper by Fuchsbauer et. al., the algebraic group model is used to directly prove the security of the EdDSA signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption \cite{EC:FucPloSeu20}. \ No newline at end of file +Instead, a different approach must be taken to abtain a tight security proof of the EdDSA signature scheme. Similar to a paper by Fuchsbauer et. al. \cite{EC:FucPloSeu20}, the algebraic group model is used to directly prove the security of the EdDSA signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption in the single-user setting and the one-more discrete logarithm assumption in the multi-user setting. \ No newline at end of file