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Aaron Kaiser
2023-05-17 19:06:15 +02:00
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thesis/sections/related_work.tex
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@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ The multi-user security of EdDSA was briefly analyzed in a paper by Bernstein af
In 2016, Kiltz et. al. provided a tight bound on the multi-user security of Schorr signatures without the need for key-prefixing \cite{C:KilMasPan16}. The tightness was a result of the random self-reducibility property of the underlying canonical identification scheme. Again, this property cannot be achieved by the EdDSA due to the clamping introduced by the key generation algorithm. In 2016, Kiltz et. al. provided a tight bound on the multi-user security of Schorr signatures without the need for key-prefixing \cite{C:KilMasPan16}. The tightness was a result of the random self-reducibility property of the underlying canonical identification scheme. Again, this property cannot be achieved by the EdDSA due to the clamping introduced by the key generation algorithm.
Instead, a different approach must be taken to abtain a tight security proof of the EdDSA signature scheme. Similar to a paper by Fuchsbauer et. al., the algebraic group model is used to directly prove the security of the EdDSA signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption \cite{EC:FucPloSeu20}. Instead, a different approach must be taken to abtain a tight security proof of the EdDSA signature scheme. Similar to a paper by Fuchsbauer et. al. \cite{EC:FucPloSeu20}, the algebraic group model is used to directly prove the security of the EdDSA signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption in the single-user setting and the one-more discrete logarithm assumption in the multi-user setting.