diff --git a/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/dlog'_implies_gamez.tex b/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/dlog'_implies_gamez.tex
index 3f2d33c..6a82dba 100644
--- a/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/dlog'_implies_gamez.tex
+++ b/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/dlog'_implies_gamez.tex
@@ -16,13 +16,14 @@ The \sdlog game is a variant of the discrete logarithm game which represents the
 
 
 \begin{figure}
+	%TODO: include padding
 	\hrule
 	\begin{algorithmic}[1]
 		\Statex \underline{\game \sdlog}
-		\State \quad $a \randomsample \{ 2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} + 8, ..., 2^{n} - 8 \}$
-		\State \quad $\groupelement{A} \assign a \groupelement{B}$
-		\State \quad $a' \randomassign \adversary{A}(\groupelement{A})$
-		\State \quad \Return $a \test a'$
+		\State $a \randomsample \{ 2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} + 8, ..., 2^{n} - 8 \}$
+		\State $\groupelement{A} \assign a \groupelement{B}$
+		\State $a' \randomassign \adversary{A}(\groupelement{A})$
+		\State \Return $a \test a'$
 	\end{algorithmic}
 	\hrule
 	\caption{\sdlog}
@@ -47,25 +48,25 @@ The adversary has to call the \ioracle oracle with a commitment $\groupelement{R
 		\large
 		\begin{algorithmic}[1] 
 			\Statex \underline{\game $G_0$ / \textcolor{blue}{$G_1$} / \textcolor{red}{$G_2$}}
-			\State \quad $a \randomsample \{2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} + 8, ..., 2^n - 8\}$
-			\State \quad $\groupelement{A} \assign a \groupelement{B}$
-			\State \quad $s^* \randomsample \adversary{A}^{\ioracle(\inp)}(\groupelement{A})$	
-			\State \quad \Return $\exists \groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*: \groupelement{R}^* = 2^c (s^* \groupelement{B} - \ch^* \groupelement{A}) \wedge (\groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*) \in Q$		
+			\State $a \randomsample \{2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} + 8, ..., 2^n - 8\}$
+			\State $\groupelement{A} \assign a \groupelement{B}$
+			\State $s^* \randomsample \adversary{A}^{\ioracle(\inp)}(\groupelement{A})$	
+			\State \Return $\exists \groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*: \groupelement{R}^* = 2^c (s^* \groupelement{B} - \ch^* \groupelement{A}) \wedge (\groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*) \in Q$		
 		\end{algorithmic}
 		\columnbreak
 		\begin{algorithmic}[1] 
 			\Statex \underline{\oracle \ioracle($\agmgroupelement{R_i}{r_i} \in \group{G}$)}
-			\State \quad Let $\groupelement{R}_i = r_1 \groupelement{B} + r_2 \groupelement{A}$
-			\State \quad $\ch_i \randomsample \{0,1\}^{2b}$
+			\State Let $\groupelement{R}_i = r_1 \groupelement{B} + r_2 \groupelement{A}$
+			\State $\ch_i \randomsample \{0,1\}^{2b}$
 			\BeginBox[draw=blue]
-			\State \quad \textbf{If} $2^c \ch_i \equiv -r_2 \pmod L$ \textbf{then}
-			\State \qquad $bad \assign true$
+			\State \textbf{If} $2^c \ch_i \equiv -r_2 \pmod L$ \textbf{then}
+			\State \quad $bad \assign true$
 			\BeginBox[draw=red,dashed]
-			\State \qquad $abort$
+			\State \quad $abort$
 			\EndBox
 			\EndBox
-			\State \quad $Q \assign Q \cup \{ (\groupelement{R}_i, \ch_i) \}$
-			\State \quad \Return $\ch_i$
+			\State $Q \assign Q \cup \{ (\groupelement{R}_i, \ch_i) \}$
+			\State \Return $\ch_i$
 		\end{algorithmic}
 	\end{multicols}
 	\hrule
@@ -101,22 +102,22 @@ The adversary has to call the \ioracle oracle with a commitment $\groupelement{R
 			\large
 			\begin{algorithmic}[1]
 				\Statex \underline{\textbf{Adversary} $\adversary{B}(\groupelement{A})$}
-				\State \quad $s^* \randomassign \adversary{A}^{\ioracle(\inp)}(\groupelement{A})$
-				\State \quad \textbf{If} $\nexists \agmgroupelement{R^*}{r^*}, \ch^*: \groupelement{R}^* = 2^c (s^* \groupelement{B} - \ch^* \groupelement{A}) \wedge (\agmgroupelement{R^*}{r^*}, \ch^*) \in Q$  \textbf{then}
-				\State \qquad $abort$
-				\State \quad Let $R^* = r_1 \groupelement{B} + r_2 \groupelement{A}$
-				\State \quad \Return $(2^c s^* - r_1)(r_2 + 2^c \ch^*)^{-1}$
+				\State $s^* \randomassign \adversary{A}^{\ioracle(\inp)}(\groupelement{A})$
+				\State \textbf{If} $\nexists \agmgroupelement{R^*}{r^*}, \ch^*: \groupelement{R}^* = 2^c (s^* \groupelement{B} - \ch^* \groupelement{A}) \wedge (\agmgroupelement{R^*}{r^*}, \ch^*) \in Q$  \textbf{then}
+				\State \quad $abort$
+				\State Let $R^* = r_1 \groupelement{B} + r_2 \groupelement{A}$
+				\State \Return $(2^c s^* - r_1)(r_2 + 2^c \ch^*)^{-1}$
 			\end{algorithmic}
 			\columnbreak
 			\begin{algorithmic}[1] 
 				\Statex \underline{\oracle \ioracle($\agmgroupelement{R_i}{r_i} \in \group{G}$)}
-				\State \quad Let $\groupelement{R}_i = r_1 \groupelement{B} + r_2 \groupelement{A}$
-				\State \quad $\ch_i \randomsample \{0,1\}^{2b}$
-				\State \quad \textbf{If} $2^c \ch_i \equiv -r_2 \pmod L$ \textbf{then}
-				\State \qquad $bad \assign true$
-				\State \qquad $abort$
-				\State \quad $Q \assign Q \cup \{ (\agmgroupelement{R_i}{r_i}, \ch_i) \}$
-				\State \quad \Return $\ch_i$
+				\State Let $\groupelement{R}_i = r_1 \groupelement{B} + r_2 \groupelement{A}$
+				\State $\ch_i \randomsample \{0,1\}^{2b}$
+				\State \textbf{If} $2^c \ch_i \equiv -r_2 \pmod L$ \textbf{then}
+				\State \quad $bad \assign true$
+				\State \quad $abort$
+				\State $Q \assign Q \cup \{ (\agmgroupelement{R_i}{r_i}, \ch_i) \}$
+				\State \Return $\ch_i$
 			\end{algorithmic}
 		\end{multicols}
 		\hrule
diff --git a/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/gamez_implies_uf-nma.tex b/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/gamez_implies_uf-nma.tex
index 75d537d..26de795 100644
--- a/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/gamez_implies_uf-nma.tex
+++ b/thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/gamez_implies_uf-nma.tex
@@ -8,17 +8,17 @@ This section shows that \igame implies the UF-NMA security if the EdDSA signatur
 		\large
 		\begin{algorithmic}[1] 
 			\Statex \underline{\game \igame}
-			\State \quad $a \randomsample \{2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} + 8, ..., 2^n - 8\}$
-			\State \quad $\groupelement{A} \assign a \groupelement{B}$
-			\State \quad $s^* \randomsample \adversary{A}^{\ioracle(\inp)}(\groupelement{A})$	
-			\State \quad \Return $\exists \groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*: \groupelement{R}^* = 2^c (s^* \groupelement{B} - \ch^* \groupelement{A}) \wedge (\groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*) \in Q$		
+			\State $a \randomsample \{2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1} + 8, ..., 2^n - 8\}$
+			\State $\groupelement{A} \assign a \groupelement{B}$
+			\State $s^* \randomsample \adversary{A}^{\ioracle(\inp)}(\groupelement{A})$	
+			\State \Return $\exists \groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*: \groupelement{R}^* = 2^c (s^* \groupelement{B} - \ch^* \groupelement{A}) \wedge (\groupelement{R}^*, \ch^*) \in Q$		
 		\end{algorithmic}
 		\columnbreak
 		\begin{algorithmic}[1] 
 			\Statex \underline{\oracle \ioracle($\groupelement{R_i} \in \group{G}$)}
-			\State \quad $\ch_i \randomsample \{0,1\}^{2b}$
-			\State \quad $Q \assign Q \cup \{ (\groupelement{R}_i, \ch_i) \}$
-			\State \quad \Return $\ch_i$
+			\State $\ch_i \randomsample \{0,1\}^{2b}$
+			\State $Q \assign Q \cup \{ (\groupelement{R}_i, \ch_i) \}$
+			\State \Return $\ch_i$
 		\end{algorithmic}
 	\end{multicols}
 	\hrule