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Fixed some spelling mistakes, thanks Henrik. again

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Aaron Kaiser
2023-06-14 16:23:56 +02:00
parent 497a789df3
commit 97e842892c
9 changed files with 28 additions and 28 deletions
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thesis/Abschlussarbeit.tex
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@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ abstract
\section{The Security of EdDSA in a Single-User Setting}
This section takes a closer look at the single-user security of the EdDSA signature scheme. This is done by sowing the SUF-CMA and EUF-CMA security of EdDSA with different styles of signature parsing. The security is under the \sdlog assumption. The \sdlog assumption is a variation of the original discrete logarithm problem, which takes the key clamping during the key generation algorithm of EdDSA into account.
This section takes a closer look at the single-user security of the EdDSA signature scheme. This is done by showing the SUF-CMA and EUF-CMA security of EdDSA with different styles of signature parsing. The security based on the \sdlog assumption. The \sdlog assumption is a variation of the original discrete logarithm problem, which takes the key clamping during the key generation algorithm of EdDSA into account.
The two main theorems for the single-user security of $\text{EdDSA}_{\text{sp}}$ and $\text{EdDSA}_{\text{lp}}$ are:
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ The two main theorems for the single-user security of $\text{EdDSA}_{\text{sp}}$
\begin{theorem}[Security of EdDSA with lax parsing in the single-user setting]
\label{theorem:eddsa_lp_su}
Let $\adversary{A}$ be an adversary against the SUF-CMA security of EdDSA with lax parsing, making at most $\hashqueries$ hash queries and $\oraclequeries$ oracle queries, and $\group{G}$ be a group of prime order $L$. Then,
Let $\adversary{A}$ be an adversary against the EUF-CMA security of EdDSA with lax parsing, making at most $\hashqueries$ hash queries and $\oraclequeries$ oracle queries, and $\group{G}$ be a group of prime order $L$. Then,
\[ \advantage{\group{G}, \adversary{A}}{\text{EUF-CMA}}(\secparamter) \leq \advantage{\curve, n, c, L, \adversary{B}}{\sdlog} + \frac{2(\hashqueries + 1)}{2^b} + \frac{\oraclequeries \hashqueries + \oraclequeries}{2^{-\log_2(\lceil \frac{2^{2b} - 1}{L} \rceil 2^{-2b})}} \]
\end{theorem}