rewrote multi-user proofs

thesis/sections/security_of_eddsa/dlog'_implies_gamez.tex

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ The adversary must call the \ioracle oracle with a commitment $\groupelement{R}$
 	
 	Assuming that $r_2 + 2^c \ch^*$ is invertible in $\field{L}$ (i.e. not equal to $0$), which is ensured due to the abort in $G_2$, both equations can be used to calculate the discrete logarithm of $\groupelement{A}$.
 	
-	\item Obviously, the runtime of $\adversary{B}$ is ppt. The \ioracle just samples the challenge uniformly at random and returns it after checking the abort condition, which is ppt. After $\adversary{A}$ has provided its solution, adversary $\adversary{B}$ just does some additions, multiplications, and an inversion, which is all ppt.
+	\item Obviously, the runtime of $\adversary{B}$ is roughly the same as the runtime of $\adversary{A}$. The \ioracle just samples the challenge uniformly at random and returns it after checking the abort condition. After $\adversary{A}$ has provided its solution, adversary $\adversary{B}$ just does some additions, multiplications, and an inversion, which does not add much to its runtime.
 	
 	\item This proves theorem \ref{theorem:advgamez}.
 \end{proof}